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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE SOURCE OF FREEDOM?
by
Arthur L. Harding*
T HIS essay was begun as a review of Dean Merrimon Cuninggim's
recently published Freedom's Holy Light.' The first reading of
the book disclosed that the subject matter and its manner of treat-
ment made it of sufficient interest to the lawyer of inquiring mind
as to make the usual brief review unsuitable. Attempts to write a
lengthier review ended in confusion. It became increasingly clear that
what was needed was a good, long preface plus a review. It is here
sought to supply that need.
In what follows it will be seen that the writer is in rather close
agreement with Dean Cuninggim's thesis. At times it may be not
entirely clear whether Cuninggim or Harding is speaking to a par-
ticular point. At such places the writer acknowledges his indebted-
ness to Dean Cuninggim for both clarity of thought and felicity of
expression. It is hoped that the writer's responsibility has been made
clear at all points of divergence and addenda.
The relationship between religious liberty, and human freedoms
and liberties in other areas has been the subject of much writing.
Many authors have explored the idea of religious liberty as the source
of other freedoms. Much of this writing has been bad writing, com-
pounded out of poor historical scholarship and a blinding loyalty
to a particular religious sect or dogma. Sometimes books based upon
careful and expert research go wide of the mark because the loyalties
of the author deflect his movement to his conclusions. So A. Mervyn
Davies in his most informative and interesting volume' concludes
that the genius of American freedom can be found in Calvinism.
The evidence so carefully marshalled seems to prove, however, that
we are indebted principally to Arminian and other religious move-
ments which were based in large part upon opposition to and resist-
ance to Calvinist tenets. These things are mentioned to point up that
Dean Cuninggim is more than usually free of this handicap. He is a
*A.B., University of Arkansas; J.D., University of Michigan; S.J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity; Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Southern Methodist University
School of Law.
1FPEEDoM'S HOLY LIGHT. By Merrimon Cuninggim. New York: Harper and Brothers,
1951. Pp. xi, 192. $2.75. The author is Dean of the Perkins School of Theology of
Southern Methodist University.
'DAVIES, FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (195 5), discussed at some length in 51
SOUTHWEST REVIEW 99 (1956).
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theologian, and proudly so, but is a theologian who embraces philoso-
phy and reason as aids to the ascertainment of truth.
A PHILOSOPHY OF MAN
In our growing concern to maintain individual liberties in an
uneasy world, it is good that we be reminded that the basic issue of
human liberty is essentially a religious issue, and that the basic in-
dividual human liberty is religious liberty.
The basic issue is a religious issue, since the measure of freedom
of expression and action accorded the individual man must rest final-
ly upon a conception as to the nature and qualities of man. This is
the major problem of theology after theology has established the
existence and nature of God. At one end of the scale are those
deists who conceive of essentially a man-centered universe; who
would find in man an innate desire to achieve the Good, together
with a faculty of reason sufficient to enable him to know the Good
and to recognize the means best suited to achieve it. At the other
end of the scale, one would find those medievalists and early Protes-
tants who carried their notion of original or Adamic sin to such an
extent as to picture man as a totally depraved being, incapable by his
own faculties to perceive Good, and with no particular desire to
attain it. If such a man is to know Good, he must know it either
directly from God through divine illumination or other mystic ex-
perience, or indirectly through those especially delegated by God to
carry His message. If he is to attain the Good, it must be by the
intervention of a divine Grace, acting either by chance or some, to
mankind, wholly inscrutable divine plan or purpose.3 If we assume
either of these extreme philosophies of man, the problem of individual
human liberty almost answers itself. In a community of god-like
humans, the liberty of the individual human is the ultimate value.
If questions of social good are injected, it must be assumed that the
social good will be best assured by leaving individual man free to
attain his own good. This, of course, was the assumption of the
Utilitarians of the early Nineteenth Century, and a good deal of our
current notions of individual liberty are built upon their doctrines.
If, on the other hand, we begin with the other extreme and re-
gard man in his natural state as an inherently evil thing, then any
notion of individual human liberty becomes impossible for the rea-
3Incisive treatment of the basic dilemma may be found in GILSON, REASON AND
REVELATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1938). See also BAKER, THE DIGNITY OF MAN




son that the individual human is incapable of exercising it.' Such a
man must be forced to order his life in accordance with the divine
will or purpose. To this end he must be subordinated totally, either
to a secular Prince ruling by Divine authority, or to a Church com-
missioned to bring the command of God to earth. Such, of course,
would be the ethical justification for Machiavelli's Prince as well as
for Geneva's theocracy. Marxist economic determinism, relegating
to the irrelevant all notions of human good save the economic, leads
to much the same conclusion.
Most people find each of these extreme positions to be untenable,
on a basis of either religious belief or observed fact, or both. The
very idea of God would require that man be posited in a condition
short of God's perfection. On the other hand the principles of cause
and purpose and order observed in all things in the universe save man,
makes it incomprehensible that the seemingly rational God who
created such a universe would exclude mankind from its scheme of
order. It is of course perceived that man has a faculty of reason not
shared by other living things, and it is assumed that this fact is related
in some way to a divine plan or purpose. From here it is no great
leap to some sort of Natural Law proposition to the effect that this
faculty of reason enjoyed by man gives him an ability, not shared
by other living things, to comprehend in part the divine plan or
purpose of the universe.
At the same time observation of the world about us shows that
all living things have a tremendous desire to live and to reproduce
themselves, even against almost insuperable obstacles. Even more,
all living things have in them a drive to bring themselves to their
ultimate destiny, to their state of perfection. Is it possible, one then
asks, to assume that man alone is without such drives; that man
alone has no inner compulsion to bring himself to that state most in
keeping with the divine plan? Does not the seemingly most debased
of men exhibit in some particular manner, almost in spite of himself,
such a drive or compulsion? 5
And so one arrives at another concept of man. Man is not per-
fection; he is not god-like. Man does have in him an inclination to
seek perfection; a desire to comprehend the god-like. Man has in his
faculty of reason a tool by which he can comprehend in part his
place in the divine order. Since he is, after all, Man and not God, his
4 See BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 4-10 (1945).
' Father Thomas E. Davitt makes this point concisely and clearly in his essay St. Thomas




faculty of reason will never permit a full participation in the divine
reason, yet he may be expected to move closer and closer to such a
participation as he gains in knowledge and experience.
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN LIBERTY AND PROGRESS
At this point a doctrine of individual liberty begins to emerge.
Individual human liberty becomes a major value since it enables
individual man to use all his faculties to perfect himself. Individual
freedom of belief, of inquiry, of action, is important because it
enables man to increase his knowledge and experience essential bases
for the fullest possible use of his faculty of reason. But such in-
dividual liberties are not absolute. They are rather to be exercised
within the over-all limitations of a concept of the Good society as
that concept can be discerned and established by human reason and
observation.
This then is a religious concept of human liberty in human
society. It is, moreover, believed to approximate the concept enter-
tained by most persons in our society. It is, of course, strongly re-
inforced by a further consideration of faith. Even on a purely secular
basis, we exhibit an almost overwhelming faith in the inevitability
of progress of our society and its institutions. Approaching the prob-
lem of progress on a purely pragmatic basis, we know from experi-
ence that human liberty is the key to that progress. We know that
every thing we now hold to be true was once dissent-that every
majority opinion was once a minority opinion. We have never
rushed to abandon old mistakes in order to embrace new truths. To
the contrary, new truth has had to establish itself, not only against
the force of social inertia but also against the force of the active
opposition of those who believe Truth had already been attained.
The price of social progress is plain. Not only must we permit
all men the greatest liberty to investigate, to learn, to believe, to
communicate, and to argue; we must encourage and aid such activity,
to the end that there may be the greatest possible increase in human
knowledge and the greatest possible application of human reason to
that knowledge. It is then the responsibility of all men in the society
to seek carefully to test new assertions of fact, to strive continually
to draw new learning, new conclusions, from new facts. The task
is to discern in a welter of conflicting opinion and argument, the
true, and to discard the mistaken and the false. So long as this is




THE PROBLEM OF THE REFORMATION
Historically, the battle for human liberty was fought in the con-
text of contention between Church and State. Human liberty as
we now conceive it could not exist in a medieval society in which
the secular state was thought to be established by God to direct men
in accordance in God's will, and a particular concept of God's nature
and will, as embodied in a human church, was established to guide
and direct the Prince in the discharge of his duty. The Reformation
of the 16th Century did not solve this problem.' It removed the
secular Prince from the control of the Church, but it left the
Prince free to become absolute ruler, as in Germany following
Luther. While the restraint of the Church on the Prince was per-
haps something less than might be desired, it was nonetheless far
better than nothing. The proper relationship between the Prince and
the new churches thus became the principal problem of the Protestant
jurists,' as well as of the Roman jurists of the Counter-reformation.8
CHURCH AND STATE: ENGLISH DOCTRINE
For English speaking people the task was undertaken late in the
16th Century by Richard Hooker, in his monumental Of the Laws
of Ecclesiastical Polity. Catholic (but non-Roman) in his theology,
Hooker deemed it unthinkable that men in a free society should be
wholly subordinated to a religious hierachy, whether of Rome or
of Geneva. Rather man should be conceived in an Aristotelian sense,
basically desiring to live peacefully with his fellows in a good society,
and with basic inclinations to bring himself to a state of individual
perfection. The principal means in man's own nature by which
he would comprehend his objectives and would select the means to
attain them, would be his God-given faculty of reason. As further
guidance was required to supplement human reason, man would
find it in the scriptures and in the traditions and experience of his
kind. Hooker differed from the Roman orthodoxy of St. Thomas
Aquinas in that he did not find the essential supplementary guidance
in the hierarchy of the Church. He differed from Calvin in that he
6See FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 35-37 (3d ed. 1953).
7 FRIEDMANN, OP. cit. supra note 6, at 38-47; D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 48-62 (1951);
SCOTT, LAW, THE STATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, C. XXXI (1939). The
name most commonly associated with this rationalist type of Natural Law is that of
Grotius. It is from Grotius that the 17th and 18th century social compact doctrines were
derived.
'This development is perhaps best exemplified in the writings of Francisco Suarez (1548-
1617), the great Spanish theologian. SCOTT, op. cit. suPra note 7, in c. XXXIII. See also
3 COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, C. XXII and XXIII (1953).
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did not find in the scriptures an immutable code of human con-
duct. He found in the scriptures the essentials of the relationship
of man to God; all else was relative or historical. He found essential
guidance in the church. The appeal was to the traditions and ex-
perience of the mass of believers To Hooker, then, the Natural Law
which was to restrain the Prince, and was to define the liberties and
responsibilities of the subject was to be drawn from human reason,
based upon human tradition and experience, and reflecting the basic
teaching of the New Testament Gospel. At the same time it was
pointed out that the Prince did not rule by divine commission. Rather
the secular state was established as an expedient and convenient thing,
with its authority resting ultimately upon the continuing acquies-
cence or consent of the body of subjects.
In Hooker's scheme of things Church and State were at the
same time quite independent and closely interdependent. Certainly
the Prince was not formally subordinated to the Church, as in
medieval and Calvinist thinking. At the same time the Church was
to be independent of the Prince, save perhaps in a few adminis-
trative details required by its organization on national lines. Certainly
Hooker would allow the Prince less authority than was claimed
in the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559, so much less that it was
found expedient to delay the formal publication of Book VIII
of the Ecclesiastical Policy until the King had fallen before the
Cromwellian Revolution.
While Church and State were thus formally independent, actual-
"Richard Hooker (1553-1600) wrote OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY be-
tween 1591 and 1600. Book I, which contains his legal theory, was published in 1593 or
1594. Book VIII, which is concerned with the problem of Church and State was not
published until 1648. The sometimes disputed authorship of Book VIII appears to have
been settled by the researches of Raymound Houk. See, HOUK, HOOKER'S ECCLESIASTICAL
POLITY-BooK VIII (1931). Houk's work is a part of a greatly revived interest in
Hooker's doctrine. SISSON, THE JUDICIOUS MARRIAGE OF MR. HOOKER AND THE BIRTH
OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (1940); DAVIES, THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF
RICHARD HOOKER (1946); MUNZ, THE PLACE OF HOOKER IN THE HISTORY OF
THOUGHT (1952); SHIRLEY, RICHARD HOOKER AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEAS
(1949). The great effect of Hooker upon early American thinking was not so much
through the Church as it was through other individuals. Examples would include Chief
Justice Sir Edward Coke, whose constitutional disputations with James I reflected Hooker's
teaching at the Temple. John Locke, whose SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
(1690) provided the constitutional theory of the United States, made frequent acknow-
ledgement of his indebtedness to "the judicious I-looker." That Locke's indebtedness to
Hooker may be even greater than was acknowledged is indicated by his ESSAYS ON THE
LAW OF NATURE, written in the early 1660's but first published in 1954. Hooker's theme
is also prominent in the writings of James Wilson, the legal scholar of the American
Revolution. Reference may be made to the journals of the Constitutional Convention,
and to WILSON'S LAW LECTURES (Andrews ed. 1896). See also SMITH, JAMES WILSON,
Chapters XXI and XXII (1956); OBERING, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF JAMES WILSON
(1934?); Witherspoon, Philosophy and The Law, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 311 (1955).
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ly they were closely dependent. The authority of the Prince was
both established by and limited by the consent, the reason, the
tradition, and the experience of the people of England. The common
law of England drew its content from these same sources of reason,
tradition, and experience. ° But these same people were the body of
the Church, and from their reason, experience and tradition, as well
as from the Gospels, was religious truth to be known. That religious
truth as perceived by the Body of the Church would restrain the
Prince was clear. Also clear was that progress of the secular State
was firmly bound to progress in the Church.
It was inevitable that Hooker's doctrine, so widely accepted in
England, would lead to a toleration of widespread differences in
religious belief.1 It did, as soon as time healed the wounds and allayed
the bitterness of the abortive Puritan Revolution. This development
both added to and subtracted from the concept of human liberty.
It added to human liberty in that the recognition of an increased
religious liberty would require the recognition of added liberties of
communication, assembly and action. It subtracted from human
liberty in that it removed a part of the moral restraint upon the
state, since there were now fewer areas of agreement in the Body
of the Universal Church.
THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY
It is not unexpected that in a new crisis of human liberty, three
centuries after Hooker, we find ourselves re-examining the problem
of Church and State. In an American setting it becomes a legal
problem, but fundamental philosophical doctrine cannot be excluded.
As an aid to further determination, we have not only a series of
warmly disputed constitutional decisions but something of a spate
of printed argumentation from lawyers, theologians, and laymen,
running the gamut from careful historical research and precise
analysis, through hasty improvisation, to fictionalized history and
doctrinal hatreds.
Dean Cuninggim contributes to this renewed debate, a careful,
moderate, deferential discussion of the basic issues." To these issues
10 It should be noted that Coke fell into the error of sometimes assuming that since
both Hooker's Natural Law and the English Common Law purported to be based upon
reason, tradition and experience, they were equivalents. On occasion Coke tended to
ascribe to Common Law the exalted authority which a more careful philosopher would
have reserved for Natural Law.
" LocKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1685?) states the basic morality in-
volved. Recent attempts to explain the whole thing on an economic basis, that Calvinism
was the religion of the rising middle class, do not alter the fact that most thinking people
appear to accept the moral basis.
'" CUNINGGIM, Op. cit. supra note 1.
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he proposes definite though unspectacular answers of a marked
common-sensical nature.
THE ESSENTIALS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Dean Cuninggim echoes Hooker with the to-be-expected Arminian
overtones, in presenting the problem of individual liberty as being a
problem of the philosophy of man, a problem which is the contem-
porary American setting is resolved as a religious problem. Religious
liberty is not just another freedom. It undergirds and supports the
others. Religious liberty of course involves the essentials of human
liberty: a freedom of expression; a freedom of action, that is, a
freedom to associate, to assemble, and to urge one's convictions upon
others; and a freedom of thought, including a power to decide. The
corollaries of this essential freedom are said to be a freedom to con-
sent, a right to join in the making of decisions; a freedom to
dissent, to express one's beliefs and arguments though they be deemed
in error; and an abiding concern for the common good.
If religious convictions underlies human freedom, it is fair to
ask what specific convictions actually constitute the foundation
stones of contemporary American notions of freedom. Dean Cun-
inggim finds four. First, is a recognition of the relatedness of men,
that one is not neutral with respect to his fellows, but rather has in
mind the good of each. Second is that the welfare of no one person
is to have precedence over the welfare of another; a recognition that
however unequal men may be in capabilities and achievements, they
are equal in essence, an equal in terms of creation, are all children
of the same Father-God. Third is the consciousness that man is
not supreme; that he is after all the creature of a Creator-Father.
Fourth is the recognition of man's dualistic nature, in which man's
capacity for goodness is linked firmly with his capacity to err, with
his bent to sin. Freedom must reject both that coercion which im-
plies that all men are sinners, and that full play of caprice which
would assume all men are saints. Freedom must proceed upon a
realistic view that all men are saints and sinners alike. Finally, free-
dom implies that man is not only free to decide, but must be free
to exercise the choice he possesses. The freedom of will which man
has must be not only possessed, it must be used.
SUPREMACY OF CONSCIENCE
Following these premises, Dean Cuninggim moves to a discussion
of the religious doctrine of supremacy of conscience and follows the
doctrine into its encounters with the Supreme Court of the United
[Vol. I11
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States. The applicable decisions are presented lucidly and the author's
comment is incisive. This writer must, however, express some linger-
ing fear that Dean Cuninggim derives a little too much comfort
from certain recent decisions.
Conscience, Dean Cuninggim remarks, is a "slippery" term for
use in philosophical discussion. In his discussion he uses the word
in what is believed to be the common or popular meaning. This mean-
ing embraces not only a consciousness of error or wrongdoing, but
also an affirmative obligation to confess what is wrong and to em-
brace what is right. Obviously the forces of the political state can-
not be employed to interfere with freedom of conscience in its first
aspect. One who believes in God cannot be prevented from forming
value judgments based upon what he receives as God's revealed or
communicated will. Legal issues may be presented in the second
aspect. Can the force of the political state be employed to prevent
one from doing that which he believes God to require of him, or to
compel the believer to do that which he believes is opposed to God's
will? Most of us are uneasy in the face of this question. The areas
of possible conflict are greatly minimized in the United States by
the substantial assimilation of the prevailing Hebrew-Christian mor-
ality into our legal institutions, but the problem does present itself
from time to time. Historical examples would include the early
Mormon doctrine of polygamy, and the religious protests against
compulsory vaccination. Of more recent memory are the cases in-
volving somewhat unusual doctrines of Jehovah's Witnesses." It is
significant that in the cases in which the legal doctrine has prevailed
as against unorthodox religious belief, the judges have felt impelled to
rest the argument not so much upon the superior power of the State,
but upon some form of Natural Law argument.
In its most recent form this problem is presented in connection with
the naturalization of aliens who express themselves, on the basis of
religious belief, as being unwilling to bear arms in defense of the
United States. In the Macintosh and Schwimmer cases14 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that such persons could not properly
take the statutory naturalization oath to support and defend the
55 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), compulsory flag salute;
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), solicitation of funds; Jones v. City of
Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1941), sale of religious literature; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940), use of sound truck for religious disputation; West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), more flag salute. The list seems almost
endless.
" United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929).
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Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic. It was found that Congress intended an obligation to bear
arms to be included in the oath, and was held that Congress had the
right to deny citizenship to those who would not assume such a
duty.' s In 1946 came the case of Girouard5 who was willing to take
the prescribed oath and was willing to serve in the armed forces in a
noncombatant capacity, but was unwilling on grounds of conscience
to bear arms. This time it was held that the applicant might properly
take the oath, that the Congress did not intend to bar such persons
from naturalization. The reasoning was based upon the "traditions"
of the country and upon the record of Congress in providing for
conscientious objectors in World War II. The Sclwimmer and Mac-
intosh cases were overruled.
Seemingly Dean Cuninggim reads the Girouard case as vindicating
the dictates of the individual conscience, at least so long as and so far
as it remains within the general orbit of the Hebrew-Christian trad-
ition, as against the force of the State. This conclusion is highly de-
batable. Mr. Justice Douglas in his majority opinion emphasizes that
the issue is one of statutory construction: the Act of Congress no-
where expressly imposes a requirement of a commitment to bear arms
upon applicants for naturalization; were the Macintosh and Schwim-
mer cases correct in implying it? The majority hold that Congress had
not imposed such a requirement. Quite carefully and properly the
majority refrained from any sort of holding as to whether the Con-
gress has power to make such a requirement express."
1 That no Justice believed a constitutional issue to be involved in the Macintosh case
is made clear by an examination of the capable dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. He
states at the outset of the opinion that there was no question of the "authority of Con-
gress to exact a promise to bear arms as a condition of its grant of naturalization," and
then proceeds to the question of statutory interpretation. 283 U.S. at 627. Chief Justice
Stone, who as an Associate Justice had joined in Hughes' dissent in the Macintosh case,
also dissented in the Girouard case on the ground that what he had regarded as a seriously
doubtful matter of Congressional purpose in Macintosh had since been clarified by Con-
gressional action prior to the Girouard case.
loGirouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
" Congress has since agreed with the argument of the Girouard case, and the present
Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the naturalization of certain conscientious
objectors and provides an alternative oath for those who are opposed to bearing arms by
reason of religious training and belief. 8 U.S.C. § 1448. Note however that Congress is
asserting its power to determine when this particular liberty of conscience will be recog-
nized. Note, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1956). Seemingly, religious belief is no defense
to a criminal prosecution for counseling failure to register for selective service. Warren
v. United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950);
Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
340 U.S. 857 (1950). Also pertinent is the decision upholding denial of admission to the
bar of one who is unwilling to profess willingness to serve in the miiitia. In re Summers,
325 U.S. 561 (1945).
[Vol. 11
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CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
The author now reaches his main thesis, the relationship of Church
and State. Putting aside generalities he moves directly into the current
area of conflict. As a careful scholar he recognizes that the conflict
is badly muddled in semantics. The proponents of a particular doc-
trine have been able to gain a great advantage in discussion by
getting the question stated in a question-begging phrase: "the sep-
aration of Church and State." The repeated use of this phrase im-
plies somehow that separation is the desideratum, and discussion
tends to turn on means and upon practical considerations.
The basic issue however is whether there should be separation. If
there should be, then how is it to be accomplished. But if separation
is not the objective, then the problem is the nature of the relation-
ship to be maintained.
Dean Cuninggim reiterates what every student of constitutional
history knows, but which not all will admit; that the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution was not designed to outlaw religion from the
secular state."s That "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion" means simply that there shall be a
religious liberty, an equality of religious faiths before the law, that
there shall be no established church such as the Church of England.
That Jefferson used the phrase "wall of separation" in a letter writ-
ten years after his retirement to a religious assembly, does not make
a "wall of separation" a constitutional mandate. Strangely, however,
Jefferson's letter did attain the status of a constitutional limitation
upon State power in a puzzling opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge."
'$ For a statement such as this, which inevitably is to be challenged, one may cite
a scholar of unquestioned authority in the field of constitutional history. Edward S. Cor-
win, The Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949).
Professor Corwin employs uncharacteristically vigorous language in denouncing the claim
that the First Amendment was intended historically to establish the "separation" of Church
and State. "The eager crusaders on the Court," he suggests, as "selling a bill of goods."
If the "wall of separation" is to be sold as a constitutional doctrine, it should be sold
on its merits and not on a falsification of history.
"'Dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In the
hands of Mr. Justice Black, this dissent became the majority opinion in McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Mr. Justice Rutledge relied upon Madison's
Remonstrance and upon Jefferson's Danbury letter. Whether the writings of Madison
actually will support such a thesis is open to question. The Jefferson letter will. It seems
proper to add that it is uncommonly bad judicial interpretation to seek the meaning
of the Bill of Rights in the writings of Madison (who was chairman of the Congressional
drafting committee) or of Jefferson (who had little to do with it). The ultimate authority
as to the intent embodied in constitutional amendments is to be found, not in Con-
gressional sources, but in the meaning of the words to those who ratified them. In the
case of the Bill of Rights we should add the purposes of those who exacted a promise
for the submission of the amendments as a condition to the ratification of the Constitu-
tion itself. Finally, we want to know what the people thought. If individual sources are
1957]
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The majority of the Court now recognizes this as error." If a "wall
of separation" is to be established, it must be because reason and ex-
perience show it to be desirable, not because the Constitution
requires it.
History supports those who would argue that Church and State
should coordinate their effects in certain areas of social activity. The
testimony of history opposes those who would build the wall of
separation. History teaches that the issue as presented involves at least
a three-way choice: a Church-dominated State afer the pattern of
the medieval Empire; a State-dominated established Church; and a
type of organically disconnected but actually coordinated Church-
State relationship. One may question the full intellectual frankness
of those who would present the issue as involving a choice between
only the first two.
The history of the disestablishment movement in the American
colonies at about the time of the Revolution, and the adoption of
the First Amendment, establishes a firm constitutional starting
point: the equality of the various religious sects before the law.
Indeed, the result could not be otherwise in a United States where
no single sect encompassed a popular majority. These steps were
taken not by men who opposed the Church and would deny its in-
fluence upon the State. Rather they were taken by men of firm
religious faith, of pride in their sect, who sought to assure that their
own faith and their own sect would receive due recognition in affairs
of state. Disestablishment was designed for the benefit of the non-
conformist sects; was designed to increase their influence and prestige.
Had the nonconformists not desired it for these reasons, there would
have been no disestablishment.
Firm establishment of the proposition that the state can favor no
single church, merely leads to the next problem: may the state pro-
perly recognize individual religion or organized religion as a whole.
That in our history the state has been willing to give aid to religion,
and, just as importantly, to receive aid from religion, is clear.
Harking back to Hooker, one may wonder whether history in a
democratic society could have been written any other way.
The legal issues of recent years have been presented in terms of
relationship between the State and religious education. To say that
to be considered, the writings of George Mason would appear more pertinent than those
of Madison or Jefferson. The trouble is that the writings of Madison and Jefferson are
well indexed and widely published. Given the same ease of access, we might well be
sifting the phrases of Thaddeus Stevens and his Radical company in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment.
"°Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
[Vol. I I
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
the decisions create confusion is charitable. Always with at least a
dissenting opinion, sometime with special concurrences, sometimes
with divergent dissents, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that the State of New Jersey may pay bus fares for children in
parochial schools;"s that the State of Louisiana may furnish free text-
books to students in parochial schools;"a that the State of Illinois
could not permit religious instruction in public school buildings, dur-
ing "released time" even at the formal request of parents;2 3 and
that the State of New York could release public school pupils for
religious instruction on "school time" if the instruction were not
conducted in the public school buildings."' A more difficult group
of judicial opinions would be hard to assemble. Sometimes the reason-
ing appears right and the results wrong. Again it may seem that the
result is right for the wrong reason. Certainly the justices appear to
be reading the histories of entirely different countries.
This confusion thrice-confounded at the summit certainly invites
the reopening of old arguments and the advancing of strange ideas.
Some Roman Catholic writers have sought to find in the confusion
a basis for greater public assistance to the mountingly expensive
parochial school system. Others would seek greater separation of
Church and State to dislodge what are considered excessive Protestant
influences upon the present State. On the other hand a strongly
anti-Roman faction is so fearful of a growth of Roman influence that
it would push separation almost to the point of governmental hostility
to all religion. The bias and distortions of these not-disinterested
classes of advocates tends to introduce bitterness into the argument,
and certainly adds to the confusion. Fortunately this clamor is sub-
siding, and we begin to hear the voices of those who seek the good of
America, not the good of a sect."s Be it noted that these new voices
are by no means drawn from any particular religious group. While
, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2"Cochran v, Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
2
3 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).24 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
2 This is not the place in which to attempt a classification and evaluation of the
immense Church and State literature, or that relating specifically to the State and re-
ligious education. Reference however should be made to the definitive treatise of ANSON
PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950), embodying the
careful research without which many of the other books would never have been written.
A most capable lawyer-like presentation of the "wall of separation" thesis may be found
in PPEPFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953). Mr. Pfeffer was of losing counsel
in the Zorach case. Among the other writings that can be recommended are Sutherland,
Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1306 (1949); BATES, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY (1945); BROWN, CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERI-
CA (1936); GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE (1941).
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the establishment of religious liberty historically was a Protestant
achievement, Protestants today are not its sole protectors.
In choosing the middle way, Dean Cuninggim stresses that a
proper Church-State relationship must be found to have two aspects.
One is the restrictive aspect of organic disconnection. The other
is the permissive aspect of impartial association with religious groups
to achieve those ends which the secular state and religion hold in
common. This view is not greatly different from that expressed in
Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion in the Zorach case" which
seeks to correct some of the contradictions of the other cases just
preceding.
There is a type of religious faith which regards religion as a
means by which one endures an essentially evil world while preparing
one's soul for a state of blessedness in a world to come. For such,
a "wall of separation" would appear good. But most do not share
so limited a concept of man's role on earth. A Catholic believer,
whether he be Roman, Anglican or Eastern, believes his duty to his
God requires him to strive to establish on earth God's laws of Love,
Justice, and Mercy. It is not only his duty to do these things in
ordering his own life, but also his right to associate with others to
bring closer a state of perfection in human society. Our Jewish
citizens place perhaps an even greater stress on this wordly aspect of
religious faith and action. Arminian Protestantism is similarly in-
clined. The Federal Council of Churches, when criticized for in-
truding into what was claimed to be a matter of political and not
religions concern, quite properly asked whether there could be an issue
of right or justice which is of purely secular concern. One is tempted
to ask also whether the erection of a "wall of separation," so as to
restrict religious action to preparing one's soul for another world
and to perhaps a Buddha-like contemplation, would not be a flagrant
governmental establishment of a particular minority religious doc-
trine. Those whose religious beliefs embrace this world as well as an-
other must defend their own religious liberty by resisting the build-
ing of the wall.
But, we are reminded, there are certain cautions to be observed.
We must remember that freedom calls for adjustment, for the asser-
tion of the rights of others as well as of our own, for the ability to
26 The legal implications of Dean Cuninggim's thesis may perhaps be best understood
by an examination of Professor Paul G. Kauper's extended review of Pfeffer's work in
Church, State and Freedom: A Review, 52 MicH. L. REV. 829 (1954), and the ensuing
interchange of views between reviewer and author in $3 MicH. L. REV. 91 and 233 (1954).
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live with others in peace and good will. We must remember that our
concern with and possible competence in certain basic issues of man's
common life does not make us expert in all the details of man's
relationships with his fellows. We must be humble in the face of the
divisiveness of religious beliefs in the world; and not lightly assume
that we and we alone are divinely commissioned to bring God's
truth to errant mankind. We must, in other words, seek to know
what sectarianism is so that it may not be permitted to intrude into
the secular state. In so doing, of course, we also identify the truly
essential values which will aid the secular state in the discharge of
its obligation to advance the good society. 7
In concluding this somewhat mixed analysis of Dean Cuninggim's
thesis and statement of this writer's own ideas as to the underlying
issues, a thought recurs which appeared at almost every step. Is it
possible to exercise religion from the State, so long as the State rests
upon the mass of men, and not upon the tyranny of a mad Prince?
Would not the erection of a towering and impregnable "wall of
separation" destroy, not religion, but the democratic state? Can
the State survive without some sort of religious ethic? Perhaps the
entire matter was disposed of in a bare fifteen words by an eminent
Englishman, Sir Alfred Denning, Lord Justice of the Court of Ap-
peal, when he wrote:"
"Without religion there can be no morality; and without morality
there can be no law."
"7 SIR ALFRED DENNING, THE CHANGING LAW 99 (1953).
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